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Abstract  -  The  performance  of  Water  Communities 
(WCs),  a  form  of  self-managing  organisation  for 
irrigation, in the Bregalnica region of the Republic of 
Macedonia  is  investigated.  Analysis,  drawing  on 
primary  survey  data,  focuses  on  the  decision  of 
farmers  to  join  a  WC  (Heckman  selection  probit 
model),  determinants  of  farmers’  satisfaction  with 
their membership of WCs (ordered probit model) and 
factors  associated  with  changes  in  farmers’  water 
payment  behaviour  (non-parametric  CLAD  model). 
Key determinants identified include transparency and 
trust with respect to the structure and operation of the 
WC,  cost  recovery  rates,  farm  size  and  irrigation 
costs.  Membership  satisfaction  is  an  important 
determinant  of  payment  behaviour.  Lessons  for 
sustainable self-management are drawn. 
 





In both developed and  less  developed  countries 
there  has  been  a  broad  shift  in  policy  away  from 
state  based  irrigation  management  towards 
supporting  the  development  of  private  and 
independent,  not-for-profit  arrangements, 
particularly local Water User Associations (WUAs). 
This  movement,  which  is  often  referred  to  as 
irrigation management transfer, has been promoted 
by nation states and international agencies such as 
the World Bank. While WUAs are widely seen to 
have  the  potential  to  be  a  superior  institutional 
arrangement  for  local  irrigation  management, 
delivering  meaningful  benefits  to  farmers  and 
taxpayers, it is nonetheless recognised that the actual 
performance  of  WUAs  has  been  patchy  [1].  It  is 
important  therefore  to  carefully  evaluate  the 
performance of WUAs and understand the principles 
that underpin successful self-government.  
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by 
evaluating the success of the introduction of Water 
Communities (WCs) in the Republic of Macedonia. 
Macedonia is a Balkan state where agriculture is the 
mainstay of rural livelihoods and substantial water 
deficiencies occur during the summer season, so that 
irrigation has a major impact on yields and hence 
incomes. By comparing performance across several 
WCs, which are a form of WUA that were created 
within  a  common  external  environment  and 
institutional  framework,  it  is  possible  to  identify 
internal principles and qualities that are critical to 
success and determine variations in outcomes.  
The  identification  of  factors  that  underpin  self-
sustaining WUAs, is particularly pertinent for states 
in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  that  have 
undergone  a  transition  from  central  planning  to 
more  market  based  economies.  This  transition  in 
agriculture was characterised by substantial falls in 
agricultural  output  and  decapitalisation  [2].  Much 
state  owned  irrigation  fell  into  disrepair  and  the 
establishment  of  local  self-governance  for 
economically  sustainable  irrigation  has  been  seen 
widely  as  an  essential  task,  although  some  have 
doubted whether this can be currently achieved in 
the  Balkans  [3].  Through  the  analysis  of  the 
performance  of  WCs  in  Macedonia  we  seek  to 
contribute  to  these  wider  debates  on  factors 
underpinning  successful  self-management  and 
opportunities  for  local  irrigation  management  in 
CEE. 
The performance of WUAs has previously been 
measured in three ways: membership rates, technical 
impact and cost recovery. Technical impact has been 
assessed  in  terms  of  changes  in  yields,  water 
availability and area irrigated. Such assessments are 
typically based on expert opinion with little recourse 
to  the  views  of  ordinary  members.  Yet  the 
sustainability  of  WUAs  will  depend  ultimately  on 
the satisfaction and retained membership of farmers. 
Moreover, previous assessments have tended to be 
based  on  comparisons  of  WUAs  from  different   2 
countries  and  market  environments  so  it  has  been 
difficult  to  identify  the  relative  importance  of 
external  factors  compared  to  member  /  resource 
characteristics  in  influencing  performance.  Our 
analysis recognises these difficulties and compares 
the performance of WUAs created in the Bregalnica 
region  of  Macedonia  under  a  common  legal 
framework  and  time  period.  This  allows  for  a 
comparison  of  cases  with  a  similar  external 
environment  and therefore a clearer  understanding 
of  the  role  of  internal  (to  the  WUA,  farm  and 
farmer) factors. Performance is measured in terms of 
propensity  to  become  a  member,  member 
satisfaction and farmers’ payment behaviour.  
 
II. THE MACEDONIAN CONTEXT  
 
Bregalnica is a semi-arid region of the Republic 
of Macedonia for which water scarcity is significant. 
Rainfall is approximately 500 mm per annum and 
occurs  principally  in  Autumn  and  Spring.  Due  to 
dry,  hot summers,  water deficits of approximately 
450 mm for crops are typical [4].  The main crops 
grown  in  the  Bregalnica  region  are  wheat,  maize, 
barley, alfalfa, rice, peppers, tomatoes, watermelons 
and  grapes.  Self-reported  non-irrigated  wheat  and 
grape  yields  are  80  and  58%  of  irrigated  levels 
respectively.  Rice,  peppers,  tomatoes  and 
watermelons are entirely dependent on irrigation for 
cultivation.  As  fruit  and  vegetables  are  the  main 
high  value  added  crops  produced,  agricultural 
incomes are heavily dependent on irrigation and this 
is acknowledged by farmers. From the farm survey 
outlined in Section 3, 94% of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement that ‘irrigation is 
very  important  for  my  livelihood’.  Depending  on 
topographical conditions and crop type, the structure 
of irrigation varies from flood irrigation for rice to, 
much more commonly, open channels and concrete 
tubes for arable and horticultural production. 
As  agricultural  fortunes  and  the  real  level  of 
public expenditure on rural infrastructure fell in the 
1990s,  the  quality  of  the  irrigation  network 
deteriorated  rapidly.  In  the  Bregalnica  region,  the 
irrigated  area  declined  from  59%  of  total  utilized 
agricultural  area  in  1990  to  26%  in  1996  [5].
1 
During the 1990s, many of the concrete channels of 
the Bregalnica system became cracked and pumping 
                                                
1 The Bregalnica irrigation system consists of a delivery 
network of 26,008 km.  
stations moribund. Water can easily be stolen from 
such a system with it being common for farmers to 
punch holes in channels to irrigate their land without 
paying. It has been estimated that at least 20% of 
irrigated water was lost due to theft and leaks from 
open channels [6].  
To improve efficiency, in 1998 a new Water Law 
was  introduced,  accompanied  by  a  project  for  the 
rehabilitation  and  reconstruction  of  irrigation.  The 
basis  of  the  latter  was  an  agreement  between  the 
Government of Macedonia and the World Bank. The 
project  covered  three  irrigation  networks:  Tikves, 
Bregalnica  and  Polog.  The  purpose  of  the  project 
was to reconstruct irrigation systems, making their 
use  sustainable  through  introducing  better 
technology  and  local  management.  We  focus  on 
Bregalnica. 
In  2002  a  protocol  for  transferring  irrigation 
management was signed. WCs can be formed where 
the  participants  in  a  given  area  account  for  more 
than  50%  of  agricultural land  in the  community’s 
territory and wish to manage irrigation and drainage 
matters  collectively.  The  WC  sets  the  prices  of 
irrigated water and drainage to its members, which 
should reflect the true costs of delivering irrigated 
water,  maintaining  the  network  and  ensuring 
adequate  drainage.  WCs  negotiate  the  supply  of 
water from a Public Water Enterprise. At the time of 
the establishment of the first WCs (May 2002), the 
average cost recovery rate was only 36%.
2  
  





Data  on  the  performance  of  the  WCs  was 
collected  via  two  methods.  Firstly,  in-depth 
interviews were conducted with a senior figure for 
each of the major WCs established in the Bregalnica 
region. The interviews collected information on the 
geographical area covered by the WC, membership, 
investment,  main  problems  encountered  and  cost 
recovery. Data were collected for the first full three 
years  of  the  existence  of  each  WC.  Secondly,  to 
understand  the  reasons  for  the  variation  in  WC 
performance in greater depth and to investigate the 
determinants of member satisfaction, a farm survey 
                                                
2 Measured as the percentage of the total billed amount 
for a given territory which was actually paid by farmers.   3 
was conducted. In total, 249 survey responses were 
collected through face to face interviews.  
The survey responses are divided into two groups: 
members of a WC (n=223) and farmers within the 
Bregalnica region who operate within a WC area but 
had chosen not to join the association (n=26). Data 
collection  from  the  latter  group  allows  us  to 
understand  why  some  farmers  have  not  chosen  to 
join  their  respective  WC.  The  distribution  of 
responses  by  farm  size  is  presented  in  Table  1. 
Estimates from senior managers of the WCs suggest, 
that on average, approximately 87% of farmers in 
the  geographical  area  covered  by  the  WCs  have 
joined.  This  suggests  that  the  sample  is  broadly 
representative in terms of the balance of members 
and non-members. 
Table  1  highlights  that  the  majority  of  farmers 
sampled farm less  than  2 hectares.  This  is  in line 
with other estimates for Macedonia as a whole [4]. 
However,  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
representativeness  of  the  sample  is  impossible 
because the last population census for the country 
was conducted in 1981 and no agricultural census 
has  been  administered  since  1964.  Non-members 
operate significantly smaller farm areas.  
 
Table 1: Classification of Members and Non-Members 
of WCs by farm size (%) 
Farm size   Member 







Less than 1 
ha  
37.2  61.5  26.5 
1 to 1.99 ha  26.0  7.7  22.5 
2 to 2.99 ha  9.9  3.8  15.3 
3 to 3.99 ha  5.4  7.7  9.6 
4 to 4.99 ha  4.9  3.8  5.2 
5 to 9.9 ha   6.3  11.5  11.2 
10 to 19.99  5.4  3.8  5.2 
20 ha+  4.9  0.0  4.4 




   
B.  Econometric Analysis 
 
Using  these  cross-sectional  survey  data  we 
estimate, as a first step, a Heckman selection probit 
model to identify causal factors related to farmers’ 
decisions to join a water community. Based on these 
estimates  we  calculate  the  inverse  Mill’s  ratio  to 
account for possible selection bias with respect to 
the estimation of the outcome equation modelled as 
an ordered probit model. Secondly, we investigate 
determinants  of  farmers’  satisfaction  with  their 
membership of water communities including, beside 
other explanatory variables, the inverse Mill’s ratio 
from  the  Heckman  selection  model.  In  a  third 
modelling step  we then explore significant  factors 
for changes in farmers’ water payment behaviour by 
estimating  a  censored  least  absolute  deviations 
(CLAD)  based  model  based  on  a  non-parametric 
estimator. Here the estimates for water community 
membership  satisfaction  gained  from  our  second 
model  are  used  as  an  explanatory  variable  beside 
other  socioeconomic  characteristics.  From  this 
procedure  we  try to reveal  if  farmers’  satisfaction 
with  water  services  can  explain  some  of  the 
variation in their payment behaviour.  
Model 1. It is expected that a farmer’s decision to 
join a water community or not is influenced by a 
multitude of factors: socioeconomic  characteristics 
at  the  household/farm  level,  production  and 
irrigation  technology  characteristics,  as  well  as 
personal  attitudes  towards  and  experiences  with 
irrigation and water communities in general as well 
as  with  respect  to  their  specific,  local  water 
community.  It  is  likely  that,  in  these  regards,  the 
characteristics  of  water  community  members  will 
differ  from  non-members.  Unobservable 
characteristics  affecting  the  decision  to  become  a 
member  will  be  correlated  with  the  unobservable 
characteristics  affecting  a  farmer’s  level  of 
satisfaction  with  his/her  water  community 
membership.  Selectivity  bias  would  be  present, 
therefore, if we were to draw inferences about the 
determinants  of  membership  satisfaction  for  all 
farmers based on the observed level of satisfaction 
of the subset which is actually a water community 
member.  Heckman’s  two-stage  sample  selection 
model  copes  with  such  a  selection  problem  by 
assuming  that  the  farmers  make  two  judgements 
with  regard  to  membership  and  membership 
satisfaction,  each  of  which  is  determined  by  a 
different set of explanatory variables [7]. Hence, it is 
based  on  two  latent  dependent  variables  models, 
where the decision to become a member or not is 
modelled as a selection equation specified as:   4 
1 if   0
0 otherwise
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                                               [1]                                 
where  i P  is a binary variable which takes the value 
one if the farmer is a member of the local WC and 
zero if the farmer decided not to become a member, 
hhdenotes  the  vector  of  socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household/farm, att stands for 
the  personal  attitudes  of  the  farmer  toward  the 
structure  and  conduct  of  the  WC,  and  irr  for  the 
irrigation technology related variables.  , ,  &  a b g d  
are  the  parameters  to  estimate,  and  u  is  the  error 
term (the corresponding log-likelihood function for  
equation above is presented in [7].  The membership 





















                                           
where satis takes the values:  
{ } 1: ' very dissatisfied' , 2: ' dissatisfied' , 3: ' indifferent' , 4: ' satisfied' , 5: ' very satisfied'
respectively,  hh  denotes  again  the  vector  of 
socioeconomic  characteristics,  att  stands  for  the 
personal attitudes of the farmer toward the structure 
and  conduct  of  the  WC,  irr  for  the  irrigation 
technology related variables, and  comm for water 
community  cost  related  characteristics. 
, , ,  &  m k t w y  are the parameters to estimate, and 
v  is  the  error  term.  Given  the  distribution  of  the 
dependent variable, we estimate the equation above 
as an ordered probit model. 
To  address  the  likely  problem  of  small  sample 
bias as well as heteroscedasticity, we estimate the 
robust  covariance  matrix  using  the  Huber-White 
sandwich estimator [8, 9]. To examine the validity 
of  the  final  model  specification,  we  test  for  the 
group  wise  insignificance  of  the  parameters  by  a 
common  generalized  likelihood  ratio  testing 
procedure. Finally a White test [9] was conducted to 
check  for  possible  heteroscedasticity.  To  test  for 
small-sample  bias  we  further  investigate  the 
robustness of our estimates obtained by applying a 
simple  stochastic  re-sampling  procedure  based  on 
bootstrapping techniques [10]. 
Model 2. Our second model focuses on explaining 
the variation in farmers’ water payment behaviour. 
Among  other  variables,  we  also  use  the  estimates 
from  Model  1  for  farmers’  satisfaction  with  their 
water  community  membership  as  an  explanatory 
variable  beside  other  socioeconomic  household 
characteristics. From this procedure we try to reveal 
if  farmers’  satisfaction  with  water  services  can 
explain  some  of  the  variation  in  their  payment 
behaviour. 
Initial  analyses  revealed  that  essential  model 
violations  (heteroscedastic  error  terms  and  a  non-
normal error distribution) lead to highly inconsistent 
parametric  estimation  results  with  respect  to 
censored  model  specifications.  Consequently,  we 
adopted  a  nonparametric  censored  least  absolute 
deviations estimator (CLAD); which was developed 
by Powell [11, 12] as a generalization of the least 
absolute  deviation  estimation  for  non-negative 
dependent  variables.  Farmers’  payment  behaviour 
with respect to their water bill can be approximated 
as: 
b e = + ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿                                                                                       
 
where payincr denotes the percentage change in the 
amount of their total water bill paid by the farmer in 
the study period from 2002 to 2004, xi as a vector of 
the observable explanatory variables for farm i (i.e. 
socioeconomic  characteristics  of  the 
household/farm, the personal attitudes of the farmer, 
the irrigation technology related variables, and water 
community cost related characteristics),  b  are the 
parameters to estimate, and  e  is the error term. L 
stands for the lower censoring bound with respect to 
the dependent variable. The CLAD estimator of  b  
minimizes  the  sum  of  absolute  deviations,  e , 
assuming  a  conditional  median  restriction  on  the 
error  term.  The  objective  function  can  thus  be 
specified as: 
{ } b b
=
￿ ￿








￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
                                                            
 
whereby the estimator uses the observations so that 
the  median  is  preserved  by  monotonic  functions. 
Hence,  the  CLAD  estimator  involves  the   5 
minimization  of  an  objective  function  that  is  not 
necessarily convex in  b . Thus, obtaining a global 
minimum of the above equation implies the usage of 
numerical  minimization  algorithms  based  on  the 
approximations  of  the  first  derivative.  The 
optimization  procedure  follows  Jonston  and 
DiNardo [13]. A White test was conducted to check 
for  possible  heteroscedasticity.  Since,  finally,  the 
estimator’s  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix 
involves the estimation of the density function of the 
error term, we use again bootstrap estimates of the 
standard errors with about 1,000 draws. 
 
IV. RESULTS  
 
Before  reviewing  the  econometric  models,  it  is 
informative to review key descriptive statistics. As 
part of the farm survey respondents were asked to 
rate their degree of satisfaction with their WC, on a 
5-point  Likert  scale  where  1  equals  ‘very 
dissatisfied’ and 5 equals ‘very satisfied’ (Figure 1). 
Only 2.5% were ‘very dissatisfied’ with the majority 
being either ‘indifferent’ or ‘satisfied’. A mere 3.8% 
were ‘very satisfied’. By this measure, therefore, the 
introduction of WCs has been neither an unqualified 
success nor failure.  
Regarding  cost  recovery,  results  are  more 
positive. For the first two years following formation 
of the WCs, average cost recovery rates, measured 
as the  percentage  of  billed amounts  actually  paid, 
were  72  and  70.6%  respectively.  This  compares 
favourably to the comparable figure of 36% prior to 
formation.  However,  significant  non-payment 
persists.  The  data  presented  in  Figure  1  however 
mask  significant  differences  between  WCs. 
Comparing mean satisfaction scores for the first six 
WCs created, significant differences are apparent (F 
test  =  2.87).  Even  with  a  common  external 
framework,  therefore,  significant  variations  in  the 
performance  of  WCs  are  evident,  suggesting  the 
importance of internal characteristics for explaining 









































Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the results for the 
estimated  models.  According  to  the  different 
diagnosis  tests  performed  all  estimated  model 
specifications are significant with no severe signs of 
misspecification.  These  conclusions  are  supported 
by the bootstrapped bias-corrected standard errors as 
well as the robust estimation technique applied for 
the Heckman selection specification which confirms 
the  robustness  of  the  various  estimates.  The 
hypotheses  tests  conducted  with  respect  to  the 
significance  of  explanatory  variables  indicate  for 
Model  1  the  relevance  of  socioeconomic 
characteristics,  farmers’  attitudes  towards  their 
water  community’s  structure  and  conduct,  utilised 
irrigation technology, and for Model 2, in addition, 
water community cost related characteristics. 
Considering  the  specific  variables  included  in 
Model  1,  it  is  apparent  regarding  the  impact  of 
household  characteristics  on  propensity  to  join  a 
WC,  only  size  of  farm  is  significant  (Table  2). 
Membership  is  not  biased  to  a  particular 
demographic group or related to years in education. 
Farmers’  attitudes  regarding  the  structure  and 
conduct  of  their  WC  were  measured  via  5  point 
Likert scales, ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 
‘strongly  agree’.  Scale  items  were  designed  to 
measure  farmers’  trust  in  the  WC  and  its  senior 
managers,  drawing  on  verified  scale  items 
developed  in  the  supply  chain  management  / 
marketing  literature.  The  Likert  scale  items  also 
captured the level of farmers’ previous experience 
with  local  associations,  degree  of  free  riding, 
effective sanctions for opportunistic behaviour and   6 
commitment to the WC. The majority of these scale 
items  are  significant;  propensity  to  join  a  WC  is 
positively  related  to  the  WC  having  transparent 
resource  use,  clear  geographical  area,  trust  in  the 
management  board,  effective  systems  of  payment 
and  transparent  management  structure.  Good 
governance  and  accountability  are  thus  vital. 
Considering  irrigation  technology,  farmers  for 
whom  a  higher  proportion  of  their  total  farm  is 
irrigated and those using flood technology (for rice) 
are  more  likely  to  join  a  WC.  This  suggests  that 





Table 2: Robust Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model – Bootstrapped Binary Probit Estimates 
 










Stage 1 – selection equation  dependent 1: water community membership 
Socio-economic  characteristics 
Hectares farmed  0.467**  2.17  [0.210; 0.221] 
Proportion of land used for crops  -0.042  -0.62  [0.066; 0.069] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.017  0.48  [-0.035; -0.036] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  -0.001  0.956  [-0.001; -0.001] 
Age of farmer  0.204  0.620  [0.321; 0.337] 
Level of education  -0.158  0.701  [-0.220; -0.231] 
Farmers attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
Water communities improve the quality of irrigation  -0.011  0.986  [-0.011; -0.011] 
WC guarantees transparent resource use  1.199***  2.54  [0.460; 0.484] 
WC covers a clear geographical area  1.201***  2.72  [0.431; 0.453] 
Irrigation is very important for livelihood  0.266  0.43  [0.603; 0.634] 
Farmers have common view on irrigation management  -0.768***  -2.59  [0.289; 0.304] 
Farmers maintain irrigation equipment for long-run use  -0.686*  -1.63  [0.410; 0.431] 
Farmers consider only their short-term interest  0.067***  2.70  [0.024; 0.025] 
Want to have a say in how irrigated water is delivered  1.515***  3.39  [0.436; 0.458] 
Want to have a say in how irrigation equipment is maintained  -0.144  -0.29  [0.484; 0.509] 
Trust in the leader of the WC  0.059  0.14  [0.411; 0.432] 
Trust in the management board of the WC  1.679***  3.79  [0.432; 0.454] 
Experience with involvement in local associations  -1.739***  -3.72  [0.456; 0.479] 
Transparent management structure  1.037***  2.89  [0.350; 0.368] 
Transparent relations between WC and water authority  -0.012  -0.02  [0.585; 0.615] 
Easy to cut access to non-payers  0.779***  3.28  [0.232; 0.243] 
Use of irrigated water can be effectively monitored  -0.632**  -2.16  [0.285; 0.300] 
Transparent structure for conflict solution  0.343  1.11  [0.301; 0.317] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated  2.131***  3.05  [0.681; 0.716] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by sprinkler technology  1.276  1.37  [0.908; 0.955] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by flooding technology  1.696***  2.61  [0.634; 0.666] 
Constant  -0.654  -0.08  [7.971; 8.379] 
log pseudo-LL  -19.114 
Wald test of model significance, chi
2(26)  91.00*** 
McFadden’s R2  0.671 
McKelvey/Zavoina’s R
2  0.899 
Cragg & Uhler’s R2  0.741 
Count R2 (adj Count R2)  0.955 (0.556) 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristics related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(17)) 








  1: * - 10%-, ** - 5%-, *** - 1%-level of significance; 2: 1000 replications.   7 
Table 3 presents the second stage of the Heckman 
Selection  model  concerning  farmers’  satisfaction 
with their membership. Empirical evidence suggests 
that membership satisfaction is related to household 
characteristics, the WC’s conduct and performance 
and the technology employed in the case of flood 
irrigation.  Regarding  household  characteristics, 
satisfaction is positively related to size of farm and 
level of education. Regarding the latter, fieldworkers 
who  collected  data  perceived  that  better  educated 
people more readily perceived the potential benefits 
of  WC  membership  and,  more  importantly,  were 
aware that benefits would accrue over time.  
Significant,  negative  correlations  between 
satisfaction  and  age,  and  proportion  of  household 
income derived  from crops are  evident.  The  latter 
may reflect that those who are more dependent on 
crops have higher requirements and demands for the 
WC. This may also explain the significant, negative 
coefficient for “irrigation is very important for my 
livelihood”.  Regarding  other  Likert  scale  items, 
members’ satisfaction is positively related to trust in 
both the leader and management board of the WC, 
presence of a transparent management structure and 
structure  for  conflict  solution.  These  relationships 
again highlight the importance of good governance 
much  of  which  rests  with  trust  of  the  senior 
managers of each WC. For instance, the satisfaction 
of  members  in  one  WC  plummeted  after  the 
community’s  President  damaged  an  irrigation 
channel and refused to pay for repairs.   
The  only  significant  relationship  identified 
between irrigation type and members’ satisfaction is 
a negative one for flood technology. Implementing 
effective  sanctions  to  punish  non-payers  is  more 
difficult in the case of flood irrigation in Macedonia 
as water typically flows freely between the plots of 
paying and non-paying farmers. Cutting supplies of 
water  to  non-payers  would  negatively  impact  on 
farmers  who  have  paid  their  bills.  This  is  also 
reflected  in  the  positive  correlation  between  cost 
recovery  of  the  WC  and  membership  satisfaction. 
Flood  irrigation,  because  it  demands  greater 
quantities of water, is also more costly per hectare. 
A  positive  correlation  is  apparent  between 
membership satisfaction and increases in a farmer’s 
water bills between the years 2002 and 2004. The 
latter  variable  can  be  considered  a  proxy  for  a 
growth  in  the  size  of  land  under  WC  irrigation. 
Individuals  who  are  expanding  their  irrigated 
activities  are  thus  more  satisfied,  suggesting  that 
structural change is likely to help reinforce the WCs. 
Those  farmers  who  are  seeking to grow  are  more 
likely  to  be  younger  and  better  educated.  The 
inverse mill’s ratio is significant. 
The results of Model 2, concerning relationships 
with  changes  in  farmers’  payment  behaviour,  are 
presented  in  Table  4.  This  analysis  is  critical  to 
assessing  the  viability  of  WCs,  given  historically 
very low levels of cost recovery and the objective of 
WCs  becoming  financially  sustainable  local 
institutions. Significant relationships are uncovered 
between  household  characteristics,  farmers’ 
attitudes,  WC  characteristics  and  payment 
behaviour. Improvements in payment behaviour are 
associated  with  a  higher  dependence  on  crops. 
Those  less dependent on irrigation have been  less 
responsive to the WCs in terms of improving their 
payment  behaviour  and  this  may  reflect  that  the 
sanction of withholding water is less severe to those 
not  engaged  in  crop  production.  Improvements  in 
payment  behaviour  are  positively  related  to 
members’ satisfaction (2
nd stage of Model 1) and the 
presence  of  effective  sanctions  for  non-paying 
farmers. Improvements in payment behaviour thus 
depend  on  the  presence  of  both  a  carrot  (better 
service  delivering  higher  satisfaction)  and  stick 
against opportunistic behaviour.  
A  positive  correlation  is  apparent  for  the 
relationship between the expansion of irrigated farm 
area, proxied by the variable ‘increase in water bill 
2002  to  2004’  and  improvements  in  payment 
behaviour.  This  again  suggests  that  structural 
change  is  broadly  positive  for  establishing  WCs. 
The coefficient for costs per hectare of land irrigated 
is significant and negative, indicating that lower fees 
are  associated  with  improvements  in  payment 
behaviour.  Older  farmers  have  been  significantly 
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Table 3: Robust Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model – Bootstrapped Ordered Probit Estimates 
 










Stage 2 – outcome equation  dependent 2: farmer’s satisfaction with water 
community membership 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Hectares farmed  0.946**  2.15  [0.113; 0.120] 
Proportion of land used for crops  -0.003  -0.19  [0.013; 0.021] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.001  -0.15  [0.011; 0.009] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  -0.013***  -2.70  [0.005; 0.006] 
Age of farmer  -0.273**  -2.04  [0.129; 0.130] 
Level of education  0.360***  2.79  [0.124; 0.128] 
Farmers’ attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
WC guarantees transparent resource use  0.019  0.11  [0.164; 0.178] 
Irrigation is very important for livelihood  -0.489***  -3.16  [0.183; 0.223] 
Want to have a say in how irrigated water is delivered  -0.249  -1.09  [0.218; 0.221] 
Want to have a say in how irrigation equipment is maintained  0.091  0.51  [0.169; 0.174] 
Trust in the leader of the WC  0.478***  2.71  [0.171; 0.175] 
Trust in the management board of the WC  1.089***  5.07  [0.207; 0.208] 
Experience with involvement in local associations  0.363***  2.09  [0.159; 0.167] 
Transparent management structure  0.885***  4.49  [0.181; 0.182] 
Transparent relations between WC and water authority  0.118  0.65  [0.159; 0.164] 
Transparent structure for conflict solution  0.269***  11.24  [0.216; 0.236] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated  -0.165  -0.43  [0.399; 0.413] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by furrow technology  0.123  0.27  [0.376; 0.446] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by sprinkler technology  0.059  0.18  [0.313; 0.322] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by flooding technology  -0.828***  -2.27  [0.429; 0.448] 
Water community cost related characteristics 
Cost recovery  0.297***  11.17  [0.023; 0.027] 
Costs per hectare of land irrigated  0.002***  2.15  [7.88e-05; 8.78e-05] 
Increase in water bill 2002 to 2004  0.001***  2.08  [5.46E-05; 6.91E-05] 
inverse mill’s ratio  -2.123***  -2.51  [0.698; 0.881] 
log pseudo-LL  -97.911 
Wald test of model significance, chi
2(24)  96.78*** 
McFadden’s R2  0.620 
McKelvey/Zavoina’s R
2  0.537 
Cragg & Uhler’s R2  0.503 
Count R2 (adj Count R2)  0.946 (0.640) 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristic related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(9)) 
 H0: irrigation technology related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(4)) 
 H0: water community cost related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(3)) 
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Table 4: Non-Parametric Cumulative Least Absolute Deviation Model – Bootstrapped Estimates 
 









Dependent: proportional change in farms’ water bill payment 2002 – 2004 
Independents 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Hectares farmed  -0.908  -0.94  [0.942; 0.990] 
Proportion of land used for crops  0.437***  5.44  [0.078; 0.082] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.447***  -8.28  [0.053; 0.055] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  0.433***  9.55  [0.044; 0.046] 
Age of farmer  -0.608***  -0.56  [1.059; 1.113] 
Level of education  0.938  0.88  [1.039; 1.093] 
Farmers attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
Farmer’s satisfaction with water community membership (y_hat model 2)  3.571***  3.25  [1.098; 1.071] 
Easy to  cut access to non-payers  4.147**  2.02  [2.053; 2.002] 
Water community cost related characteristics 
Membership  -3.908  -0.85  [4.597; 4.483] 
Costs per hectare of land irrigated  -0.003***  -6.02  [4.98E-04; 4.86E-04] 
Increase in water bill 2002 to 2004  0.004***  13.71  [2.92E-04; 2.84E-04] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
proportion of total farm area irrigated  -2.776  -0.78  [3.559; 3.470] 
Constant   -17.411  -1.44  [12.091; 11.789] 
minimum sum of deviations  2966.997 
Adj. McFadden’s R2  0.878 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristics related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(3)) 









V. CONCLUSION  
 
In  explaining  variations  in  satisfaction  and 
payment  behaviour,  the  internal  structure  and 
conduct  of  the  WC  is  highly  significant.  In 
particular,  the  presence  of  good  governance  and 
accountability  contribute  to  the  decision  to  join  a 
WC,  membership  satisfaction  and  changes  in 
payment  rates.  Analysis  reveals  that  good 
governance  requires  effective  leadership, 
transparency  in  resource  allocation  and  trust  in 
senior  managers.  While  the  constitutions  of  each 
WC  can  detail  responsibilities  and  procedures  to 
help  maximise  transparency  and  promote 
accountability, much will rest on local factors.   
Cost  recovery  has  improved  dramatically  since 
the introduction of the WCs. Model 2 reveals that 
improved payment behaviour depends on, amongst 
other  variables,  both  the  positive  satisfaction  of 
members and effective sanctions against non-payers. 
Previous  studies  have  rarely  paid  attention  to 
membership satisfaction, yet our analysis indicates 
that it is a critical determinant of payment behaviour 
and hence the long-run viability of WUAs.  
In  assessing  whether  WUAs  can  be  usefully 
introduced, policy makers have to consider whether 
they can deliver both the carrot of a reliable service 
and  stick  of  sanctions  against  opportunistic 
behaviour. Local, internal factors are significant in 
determining  the  actual  size  of  carrots  and  sticks 
faced by farmers. Consequently, even if WUAs have 
been successfully introduced in one location, it does 
not  follow  that  the  same  rules  and  procedures 
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